Policy & Advocacy

Backgrounder on Korean Peninsula-Nuclear Disarmament-De-escalation of Conflict, February 2019

Topic
Office/Committee
Year Published
  • 2019
Language
  • English

Backgrounder on Korean Peninsula, Nuclear disarmament and de-escalation of conflict, February 2019

Tensions peaked in 2017 as North Korea advanced its nuclear and missile programs, prompting U.S. “maximum pressure” sanctions and hostile rhetoric. Positive diplomatic openings in 2018—Inter‑Korean rapprochement, the Panmunjom Declaration, U.S.–DPRK and interregional summits, prisoner releases, and trilateral meetings among China, Japan, and South Korea—created hope for denuclearization and a peace process, but talks are stalled and progress remains fragile.

Core challenges

  • Denuclearization versus sanctions relief: the U.S. insists on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) before lifting sanctions; North Korea seeks incremental economic rewards for phased steps; South Korea favors phased, verifiable actions tied to incentives.
  • Verification and scope: North Korea likely has many dispersed sites, complicating inspections, verification, and dismantlement.
  • Military balance: Large conventional arsenals and U.S. forces in South Korea (≈25,000 troops), joint exercises, and systems like THAAD complicate regional security dynamics and provoke Chinese and DPRK opposition.
  • Regional politics: China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the U.S. have differing priorities and leverage; China favors easing sanctions, Japan emphasizes security and abductee issues.
  • Domestic politics: Leaders in all states face internal constraints that affect bargaining flexibility and durability of agreements.
  • Humanitarian and human‑rights concerns: Sanctions impede delivery of food, medicine, and aid to millions in need; DPRK has severe human‑rights abuses, including prison camps and religious repression.

Key tradeoffs and risks

  • Lifting sanctions too early risks rewarding a non‑compliant regime; insisting on CVID may stall talks.
  • Reductions in U.S. military presence or exercises could be perceived as concessions that ease tensions or could weaken deterrence and regional reassurance.
  • Premature reliance on inspections may miss hidden sites; inadequate verification risks incomplete dismantlement.
  • Failure of diplomacy risks renewed testing, escalation, or even pre‑emptive military options with catastrophic consequences for Seoul and the region.
  • Retention of DPRK nuclear capability would likely trigger regional proliferation.

Policy implications

  • Progress hinges on sequencing acceptable to all parties: credible, verifiable denuclearization steps tied to phased sanctions relief and tangible economic incentives.
  • Humanitarian access should be insulated from political disputes to address malnutrition, health care, and interrupted medical programs.
  • Regional coordination—especially involving China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the U.S.—is essential for enforcement, verification, and durable security arrangements.
  • Any durable settlement should address verification capacity, transitional security guarantees, and measures to manage conventional forces and alliance concerns.

Catholic Church in Korea

Catholics are about 10% of South Korea’s population but hold outsized influence—roughly 25% of Parliament and 35% of military leadership—and are widely respected for promoting democracy, equality, and anti‑corruption efforts.

Catholic leadership and peace efforts

  • The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea (CBCK) plays an active role in promoting peace on the peninsula, contact between separated families, and humanitarian aid to North Korea.
  • CBCK leaders advocate denuclearization, restoration of trust through sustained dialogue, and a gradual rapprochement that treats North and South as partners rather than enemies.
  • Archbishop Hyginus Kim called for denuclearization, frequent dialogue, and time to build mutual acceptance as foundations for lasting peace.

Alignment with South Korean government

  • President Moon Jae‑in, a practicing Catholic, shares the Church’s goals: denuclearization, security guarantees for the North, a permanent peace accord endorsed by regional actors, resumed exchanges, and a vision of “mutual development” or a “new economic community” on the peninsula.
  • The CBCK broadly supports Moon’s outreach, while some bishops differ on the pace of engagement.

Recent actions and endorsements

  • The CBCK strongly endorsed the April 27, 2018 Inter‑Korean summit and the Panmunjom Declaration as steps toward denuclearization and reunification.
  • Pope Francis praised the summit and the leaders’ commitment to dialogue.
 
Papal diplomacy and Church exchanges
  • The CBCK favors a papal visit to North Korea if invited, believing it would advance peace regionally and globally.
  • South Korean bishops and clergy have made limited visits to the North; Archbishop Hyginus Kim accompanied President Moon to Pyongyang in September 2018.

Institutional initiatives and policy positions

  • The Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace (CINAP), founded by Bishop Peter Lee Ki‑heon near the DMZ, hosted international conferences (Nov 2017, Nov 2018) on the Church’s role in regional peace.
  • Conferences addressed Church teaching on disarmament, post‑Cold War reconciliation, criticized long‑term sanctions as ineffective, and urged a more active U.S. stance toward reducing hostility and building new U.S.–North Korea relations.

RESOURCES: Visit https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/global-issues/asia/korea/ and Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea’s website https://english.cbck.or.kr/index

Backgrounder-on-Korean-Peninsula-2019-02.pdf