Section V: Religious Liberty and the Supreme Court

2025 was an exceptionally active year for religious liberty before the Supreme Court. The Court issued three rulings in cases squarely addressing religious liberty issues: two victories and one split decision that left in place an adverse ruling below. In a fourth ruling, in U.S. v. Skrmetti, the Court declined to hold that people identifying as transgender are a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause—a result that would have had disastrous consequences for religious exercise. The Court also granted certiorari in a pair of cases that present a similar question, to be argued and decided in 2026.

Rulings

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Commission (U.S. No. 24-154)

Catholic Charities Bureau of the Diocese of Superior (CCB) brought suit after being denied an exemption from a requirement to pay state unemployment taxes, in order to participate instead in a church-run program that offers the same level of benefits. State law provides an exemption for non-profit organizations operated primarily for religious purposes, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a finding that CCB is not primarily operated for religious purposes. The court reasoned that CCB does not do “typical” religious things like proselytize or hold worship services and does not primarily employ and serve Catholics. The court also held that, because CCB is separately incorporated from the Diocese of Superior, CCB cannot derive its religious purpose from the Diocese.

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a state violates the First Amendment’s religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior. The Court unanimously ruled that Wisconsin had imposed an impermissible denominational preference by differentiating between religions based on theological lines. 

The USCCB Office of General Counsel joined an interfaith amicus brief arguing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling violates the principle of church autonomy and undermines religious organizations’ ability to fulfill their religious missions as their faiths require. The brief is available at www.usccb.org/resources/25-0203_CCB_v_WILaborIndustry.pdf. 

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond (U.S. No. 24-394), consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School (U.S. No. 24-396)

Oklahoma’s state constitution and its statute governing charter schools prohibit state funds from going to religious entities. However, Oklahoma’s previous attorney general determined that such an exclusion violates the First Amendment. St. Isidore’s Virtual Catholic Charter School, a joint project of the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, applied for and received approval from the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board to contract with the state to operate as a virtual charter school. The new Oklahoma Attorney General then intervened and obtained a ruling from the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidating the approval. The court held that excluding St. Isidore’s does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, and that public charter schools under Oklahoma law are legally equivalent to government entities (state actors), so it would violate the Establishment Clause for a public charter school to be religious.

The Supreme Court granted review on both central aspects of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling. Justice Barrett recused herself from the case for undisclosed reasons. The Court issued an evenly split 4-4 per curiam opinion (an opinion from the Court as a whole, not attributed to any justice), leaving in place the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling. The opinion included no explanation of either side’s reasoning. 

The USCCB Office of General Counsel filed an amicus brief in support of St. Isidore’s, focusing on how the history of Catholic education in America shows that education is not traditionally the exclusive province of the state. The brief is available at www.usccb.org/resources/25-0312%20Isidore_vDrummond.pdf. 

Mahmoud v. Taylor (U.S. No. 24-297)

A Maryland public school district refused to allow parents to opt for their elementary-school children out of curricular content promoting gender ideology. An interfaith coalition of parents sued, alleging that the district’s refusal violates their religious freedom under the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasizing that the parents had not yet presented enough evidence on how the objectionable content and materials were being used in classrooms, denied the parents’ request for a preliminary injunction. 

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out. In a 6-3 ruling, the Court held that a state-imposed burden on the parental right to control the religious upbringing of one’s children triggers strict scrutiny, which Montgomery County failed because it permits opt-outs for various reasons other than religious objections. The Court viewed the parents’ case as akin to Wisconsin v. Yoder, a seminal First Amendment case in which the Court struck down a Wisconsin law that compelled Amish children, contrary to Amish religious beliefs, to attend school past the age of fourteen.

The USCCB Office of General Counsel joined an interfaith amicus brief led by the LDS Church, arguing that the petitioners’ beliefs are widely held and that a finding of direct coercion is not a necessary condition for judicial protection of religious exercise. It is available at www.usccb.org/resources/25-0312_Mahmoud_v_Taylor.pdf.

U.S. v. Skrmetti (U.S. No. 23-477)

Tennessee, like twenty-three other states, passed a law prohibiting the performance of “gender transition” procedures on children. The federal government sued, arguing that the law constitutes sex-based discrimination that is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit upheld the law, finding that it draws no impermissible distinctions among classes of people, but rather treats similarly situated individuals similarly. 

The Supreme Court granted review on the question of whether Tennessee’s law violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for a six-justice majority, ruled that Tennessee’s law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it draws distinctions on the basis of different medical uses of the relevant drugs and procedures, rather than classifying on the basis of sex or transgender status. Because the Court found the law did not classify on the basis of transgender status, it did not reach the question of whether transgender status is a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. 

The USCCB Office of General Counsel’s amicus brief opened by explaining the Church’s teaching that “The body is not an object, a mere tool at the disposal of the soul, one that each person may dispose of according to his or her own will, but it is a constitutive part of the human subject, a gift to be received, respected, and cared for as something intrinsic to the person.” It then emphasized the peril for religious liberty that a ruling against Tennessee would pose. The brief is available at www.usccb.org/resources/24-1016_Skrmetti_FILED%20FINAL.pdf.

Oral Arguments

Chiles v. Salazar (U.S. No. 24-539)

In 2019, Colorado passed a “conversion therapy” ban that prohibits licensed counselors from engaging “any practice or treatment … that attempts or purports to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity.” Kaley Chiles, a licensed counselor whose practice of talk-based therapy is guided by her Christian faith, sued on the basis that the law infringes the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s law on the basis that it regulates conduct, not speech. The Supreme Court granted review on the question of whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause. 

The USCCB Office of General Counsel filed an amicus brief, joined by the Colorado Catholic Conference and the Catholic University of America. The brief emphasizes the dangers of a ruling that the Free Speech Clause permits censorship of conversations on a topic as profound and fundamental as sexuality and sexual morality. It is available at www.usccb.org/resources/25-0701_24-539%20Amici%20Brief.pdf. 

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin (U.S. No. 24-781) 

New Jersey’s Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors’ names. First Choice challenged the subpoena in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a federal statute that creates a private right of action for deprivation of rights protected under federal law. The Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce the subpoena in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General’s motion to enforce the subpoena but expressly did not decide First Choice’s federal constitutional challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the federal district court held that First Choice’s constitutional claims were not ripe for review. The Third Circuit affirmed, First Choice sought Supreme Court review, and the Court granted it. 

While the case presents a question about the availability of federal courts to hear claims for deprivation of constitutional rights, not about the constitutionality of compelling disclosure of donor rolls, its implications for religious institutions’ freedom from government intrusion are substantial. The USCCB Office of General Counsel filed an amicus brief focusing on how compelled disclosure laws threaten church autonomy: www.usccb.org/resources/25-0903_USCCB_AB_First%20Choice%20v.%20Platkin.pdf. Oral argument in the case took place on December 3.

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections (U.S. No. 23-1197)

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) has a sister statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), specifically governing religious freedom in the contexts of prisons and land use. Courts have generally interpreted the two statutes’ identical text to carry identical meanings. In the 2020 case Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court held that government officials can be liable for money damages in their individual capacities for violations of RFRA. 

Damon Landor is a devout Rastafarian and an inmate in the Louisiana prison system. When he was transferred to a new prison, he brought a copy of a Fifth Circuit decision holding that RLUIPA gave him a right to keep his dreadlocks. Prison officials responded by throwing that decision into the trash, strapping Landor down, and shaving him bald. He sued, seeking monetary damages from the individual prison officials responsible. Based on its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit held that individual money damages are not available under RLUIPA, Tanzin notwithstanding. The key difference to the court was that, while RFRA was enacted under Congress’s power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, Congress passed RLUIPA under its Spending Clause power.

The Supreme Court granted Landor’s petition for certiorari, and oral arguments were held on November 10.

Grants and Denials of Certiorari

Little v. Hecox (U.S. No. 24-38); West Virginia v. B.P.J. (U.S. No. 24-43) (cert. granted)

Idaho and West Virginia have laws requiring that sports teams at schools in their states be separated by sex. In both states, male students who identify as female challenged the laws. The 9th Circuit ruled that Idaho’s law violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, and the 4th Circuit ruled that West Virginia’s law violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination. The Supreme Court granted review on both bases. 

The USCCB Office of General Counsel filed an amicus brief in support of the states. Because the USCCB’s brief in U.S. v. Skrmetti addressed the issue of transgender status under the Equal Protection Clause, the brief focuses on the Title IX question. Numerous religious liberty problems have arisen from federal agencies and courts interpreting Title IX to prohibit gender identity discrimination, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ gender transition mandate under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, which incorporates Title IX’s sex discrimination standard by reference. 

The USCCB’s brief is available at www.usccb.org/resources/25-0925_AMICUS%20BRIEFS%20Little%20v%20Hecox.pdf. Oral argument in the case is scheduled for January 13, 2026.

Apache Stronghold v. United States (U.S. No. 24-291) (reh’g denied)

Oak Flat, a site sacred to the Western Apaches, sits on land owned by the federal government, which plans to transfer it to a copper mining company that will completely destroy it. Apache Stronghold, a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting Native American sacred sites, brought suit challenging the transfer of the land under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Ninth Circuit held that the destruction of the site would not substantially burden the Apaches’ religious exercise. Apache Stronghold filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, but the Court declined to take the case and denied Apache Stronghold’s petition for rehearing. With Justice Alito recused from the case, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari.

The USCCB, together with the Christian Legal Society and the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops, filed an amicus brief in support of Apache Stronghold’s petition for certiorari. The brief argued that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the meaning of the term “substantial burden” under RFRA, particularly with regard to an earlier decision by the Supreme Court called Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. In Lyng, the Court found that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the federal government from building a road through and possibly harvesting timber within a Native American sacred site. The brief argued that Lyng does not inform the term “substantial burden” in RFRA, and noted that Lyng played a significant role in the reasoning of the courts that upheld the so-called “accommodation” to the HHS contraceptive mandate.

The USCCB’s brief is available at www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/amicus-briefs/upload/24-1016apachestrongholdfiledfinal.

Miller v. McDonald (U.S. No. 25-133)

In 2019, New York repealed the exemption in its school immunization law for religious objections to vaccines. The law now applies to all students attending public, private, or parochial schools, except those who qualify for the law's medical exemption. Two parents of Amish students, three Amish schools, and an elected representative of all Amish schools in New York sued New York officials, claiming that the school immunization law infringes on their free exercise rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Second Circuit upheld the law, reasoning that it is neutral toward religion and generally applicable, and therefore valid under Employment Division v. Smith. The court distinguished the case from Wisconsin v. Yoder.

The Amish filed a petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted it, vacated the judgment below, and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, which had applied Yoder.